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Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle'
began as a rather ordinary dispute between a public high school
teacher and his employing school board. In 1971, the school board
decided not to renew the teacher's contract, thus denying him both
continued employment and tenure. After requesting a statement of
the reasons for the board's decision, the teacher received a written
reply which referred to his "notable lack of tact in handling profes-
sional matters,"2 but cited only two grounds for that conclusion:
(1) his action in notifying a local radio station about a school board
policy for a dress code applicable to teachers; and (2) his use of
"obscene gestures to correct students" during an incident in the
school cafeteria.8
In federal district court, the teacher was awarded back pay and
reinstatement because his exercise of first amendment rights in
communicating with a radio station was found to have "played a
'substantial part' in the decision not to renew"4 even though the
school board at trial had offered additional reasons supporting its
original decision.5 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
t B.A., University of Kentucky, 1963; M.A. University of Chicago, 1964; J.D., University
of Kentucky, 1967; Associate Professor at University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of
Law.
1. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
2. Id. at 283 n.1.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 284 (quoting the district court opinion).
5. Id. at 285.
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without a published opinion.6
After dispensing with threshold issues, the Supreme Court7
reached the merits of the teacher's constitutional claim. Although
agreeing that the teacher's communication with the radio station
was protected constitutionally, the Court, per a unanimous opinion
by Justice Rehnquist, expressed disagreement with the district
court's "substantial part" analysis.8 The key issue, the Court indi-
cated, was the appropriate standard or "rule of causation" to be
employed when a mixture of permissible and constitutionally im-
permissible reasons had entered into the decisional process of the
school board.9 For a case involving mixed motives, the district
court's "substantial part" test was deemed inadequate as the sole
guide for determining whether the protected activity was a "cause"
of the board's determination. 10 Essentially, the Court indicated
that a "substantial part" test was too favorable to individuals in
the teacher's position and would require remedies in cases where
the decisionmakers' impermissible consideration of protected ac-
tivity could not be fairly said to have caused the original personnel
decision.1" Instead, "the proper test to apply in the present context
is one which likewise protects against the invasion of constitutional
rights without commanding undesirable consequences not neces-
sary to the assurance of those rights."1 2 That test was recited as
follows:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to
show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this con-
duct was a 'substantial factor'-or, to put it in other words, that it was a
'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire him. Respondent
having carried that burden, however, the District Court should have gone
on to determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.'
0
Without any explanation as to how this "test" satisfied the basic
6. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975), af'd
in part, vacated in part, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
7. 429 U.S. at 276-81 (e.g., jurisdiction; the school board's claim of immunity from suit).
8. Id. at 284.
9. Id. at 285-87.
10. Id. at 285-86.
11. Id. at 285.
12. Id. at 287.
13. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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criterion announced by the Court, the judgment of the court of
appeals was vacated and the case remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with Mt. Healthy.14
Mt. Healthy, if confined to its immediate subject, would re-
present simply another in a line of Supreme Court decisions which
address the constitutional protections of public school teachers and
university professors.18 The decision, however, has become a prece-
dent of more than academic interest.
One natural development has been the extension of this test to
other government employees alleging discharge or discrimination
because of their exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 16
More significantly, the Mt. Healthy test has expanded beyond con-
stitutional borders. The most notable, visible, and controversial ex-
tension of the Mt. Healthy test into statutory domains has been its
adoption by the National Labor Relations Board in cases arising
under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. 17 In
Wright Line,'8 the National Labor Relations Board announced
that it would "examine causality"' 9 in section 8(a)(3) cases
"through an analysis akin to that used by the Supreme Court in
Mt. Healthy."20
14. Id.
15. E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
16. E.g., Monsanto v. Quinn, Comm'n, Dept. of Fin., 674 F.2d 990 (3d Cir. 1982); Wilson
v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982). The gravitational pull of the Mt. Healthy test has even
led some members of the Court to suggest its application in another first amendment con-
text, the removal of books from a school library, rather than the removal of teachers from
the school. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853 (1982).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(1976). This section of the Act provides, in pertinent part: "(a)
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... (3) by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization.. .. "
18. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 984 (1982).
19. Id.
20. Id. The Board summarized its test in the following language:
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a prima facie showing suffi-
cient to support the inference that protected conduct was a "motivating factor" in
the employer's decision. Once this is established, the burden will shift to the em-
ployer to demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even in the
absence of the protected conduct. Id. at 1089.
1983]
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Aside from Wright Line, the Mt. Healthy test has been applied
in several cases arising under statutory provisions which prohibit
retaliation against an employee who has reported an employer's vi-
olations of the law, filed some form of complaint, or testified in
adminstrative or judicial proceedings against an employer.21 Thus,
the influence of the Mt. Healthy test is discernible and growing.
Its tendency to extend into cases arising under labor statutes is
clear. Indeed, the Mt. Healthy test is a likely candidate for appli-
cation as the guiding legal principle whenever the motives and rea-
sons behind a particular decision are relevant in determining
whether some right has been violated or some duty breached.2 2
Yet, the readiness with which the Mt. Healthy test is being ex-
tended to statutory fields is not necessarily attributable to any in-
herent soundness it may have as a rule of causation. During its
creeping eruption from a holding in a relatively obscure case to a
principle which is spreading into the territory of labor law, the Mt.
Healthy test itself has been rarely subjected to careful examination
A substantial number of court of appeals decisions in the past three years have cited, and
addressed to a greater or lesser extent, the Wright Line/Mt. Healthy analysis of § 8(a)(3)
cases. See Zurn Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3110 (1983) and cases cited therein at 687 n.9.
21. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982)(42 U.S.C. §
5851 (Supp. IV 1980)) (Energy Reorganization Act); Secretary of Labor v. Consolidated Coal
Co., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2786, 2 M.S.H.C. (BNA) 1001 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 663 F.2d
1211 (3d Cir. 1981)(30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (Supp. IV 1980)(Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act)); Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1977), afl'd, 611
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979)(29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976)(Occupational Safety & Health Act)).
22. Readily foreseeable directions of its further spread include cases arising under other
statutory provisions which prohibit retaliation against an employee who has reported an
employer's alleged violations of the law, filed some form of complaint against an employer,
cooperated with government investigators, or testified in administrative or judicial proceed-
ings against an employer. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3)(1976);
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(4)(1976); Title VII, Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-(a)(1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (Supp. IV 1980); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1976); Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 441(a),
(b)(1)(Supp. IV 1980). Nor does it take prophetic powers to foresee other statutory provi-
sions in the field of labor law which may be influenced by the gravitational pull of the Mt.
Healthy test. Prohibitions against discharge because of garnishment of wages, protection of
employees exercising rights under statutes protecting their pensions, and the right of mem-
bers of union vis-&-vis the union itself, are a few examples which come immediately to mind
as potential fields for Mt. Healthy to take root. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act,
15 U.S.C. § 167(a) (1976); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1140,1141(1976); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(5)(1976).
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on its own merits.2 3 Accordingly, Mt. Healthy's expansive tenden-
cies cannot be explained on the basis of any strengths demon-
strated by logic, experience, or rigorous analysis. Its growing ac-
ceptance in other contexts, however, becomes more understandable
if considered against the background of various problems which
have generated a climate in which any authoritative-sounding pro-
nouncement of the Supreme Court regarding questions of motiva-
tion and causation would have been influential.
On a general level, inquiry into either motive or causation has
long been troublesome for legal systems. This trouble arises be-
cause the inner workings of the human mind are not observable
and the considerations prompting an individual to act a certain
way are seldom a matter purely of conscious calculation. Causation
is a problem because any number of factors arguably may have
contributed to a particular event. Both are elusive concepts which
are difficult to define, much less to apply.2 4 When an adjudicator
23. Administrative agencies and courts which have adopted the Mt. Healthy test for use
in statutory contexts have not engaged in any extensive analysis of the merits of the test
itself. The soundness of the test seems to have been taken for granted. See, e.g., Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
984 (1982); Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1977), aff'd,
611 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1979); Secretary of Labor v. Consolidation Coal Co., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C.
2786, 2 M.S.H.C. (BNA) 1001 (1980); NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d
666 (1st Cir. 1979). Among commentators, the expansive tendencies of Mt. Healthy have not
gone unnoticed. However, most articles dealing with Mt. Healthy have been preoccupied
with addressing the extension of the Mt. Healthy test to particular areas of the law dealing
with employment relationships. See, e.g., Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-
Motive Title VII Action: A Social Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. Rav. 292, 316 (1982); DuRoss,
Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt. Healthy Board
of Education v. Doyle Upon the N.L.R.A., 66 GEo. L.J. 1109 (1978); Lane, The Effect of Mt.
Healthy City School District v. Doyle Upon Public Sector Labor Law: An Employer Per-
spective, 10 J. OF LAW AND EDUC. 509 (1981); Roth, The Effect of Mt. Healthy City School
District v. Doyle upon Public Sector Labor Law: A Union Perspective, 10 J. OF LAW AND
EDUC. 517 (1981); Wolley, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 385 (1980).
Collectively, such analyses are helpful in forming a body of critical assessment of the Mt.
Healthy test. Nevertheless, when considered individually, they amount to a series of piece-
meal critiques which unavoidably have the flavor of special pleading, no matter how well
done or perceptive. Only one commentator engages in a critique of the Mt. Healthy test
itself. See Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal of Public Employ-
ees, 89 YALE L.J. 376 (1979).
24. Perhaps Chief Justice Burger summarized the limitations of the law in dealing with
human motivations and decisionmaking as well as any jurist could:
'[T]he practical business of government and administration of the law is obliged
to proceed on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the assumption
that mature and rational persons are in control of their own conduct.'
1983]
Detroit College of Law Review
must address not only motivation, but also motivation as a "cause"
of some action, the problems inherent in dealing separately with
either subject are compounded.2
Cases arising under labor statutes are not immune from these
general problems. Indeed, the general problems of assessing motive
and causation are more frequently encountered in labor law than
in other fields. A substantial number of statutory provisions forbid
employers, and unions, from taking actions motivated by statuto-
We are nonetheless cognizant of the fact that this assumption must continually
confront the inherent practical obstacle of one person's being unable to know with
certainty the content of another's mind.
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 282 (1978) (Burger, C. J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (quoting in part Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 80
(1942)) (citations omitted).
25. Legal causation, even without the complicating element of motivation as a cause, has
generated its own share of scholarly rumination and judicial pragmatism. As one commenta-
tor observed,
the word 'cause' is one that the law has borrowed from the layman's terminol-
ogy, and this child of the street, unlike the artificial creatures of our professional
vocabulary, simply will not behave. It refuses to submit to any effort at classifica-
tion and it insists upon spilling itself throughout every area of the controversy.
A cause is not a fact in the sense that its existence can be established merely
through the production of testimony. Although evidentiary data must supply the
raw material upon which a finding of cause or no-cause will be based, yet some-
thing must first be done with this data by the trier, be he judge or juryman. He
must refer the facts presented by the testimony to some judging capacity within
himself before he can venture the conclusion that a cause exists.
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 61 (1956)(emphasis added).
The bulk of scholarly groping on causation seems to have been dominated by issues related
to physical causes in tort law. E.g., Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. REV. 42
(1962); Green, The Causal Relations Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962).
Ventures into the problems of the interaction between human motives and causation often
deal with specialized considerations. E.g., Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach
to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95. Many ven-
tures have been simplistic, truncated, or misleading. For example, even in one of the leading
modern works on causation and the law, the concept of human motivation as the cause of a
decision or action has been addressed in terms such as the following:
When it is sought to explain a human act by discovering the reasons for it the
actor's evidence of his reasons, if correctly remembered and honestly stated, is
conclusive and his statement of the reasons is therefore always admissible, evi-
dence. In the absence of such evidence other conduct on the part of the actor may
throw light on his reasons, or the court may be able to reach a conclusion on the
basis of ordinary knowledge about the usual reasons for acting in a particular way.
H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, 367-68 (1973)(emphasis added).
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rily impermissible reasons.2 6 Yet, identical actions, taken for per-
missible reasons, would not be prohibited.
Apart from the generic problems accompanying any inquiry into
motive and causation, there are several complicating elements
which, collectively, are peculiar to labor law. First, litigation which
turns upon the reasons behind a particular employment decision is
typically fact-intensive. If a case is worth litigating, then there are
likely to be serious issues of credibility, circumstantial evidence of
intention or motive, and a delicate fabric of inferences drawn from
the case's facts."7 The complexity of the factual inquiry itself may
have complicated development of coherent legal principles. Sec-
ond, the sheer number of potentially applicable statutory provi-
sions represents a further complicating element peculiar to labor
law. In the area of protecting employees against discriminatory dis-
charge or discipline alone there has been a virtual proliferation of
federal statutes in the past twenty years.' 8 Each statutory provi-
sion has its own substantive language, underlying policies, legisla-
tive history, procedural framework and body of decisional prece-
dent. Third, a special need exists to accomodate the interests of
employers, who institutionally desire the greatest possible latitude
in making workplace decisions, with the sometimes conflicting in-
terests of employees. Under the National Labor Relations Act, for
example, an abiding theme of decisional precedents has been the
need to balance these interests.29 Fourth, various statutory provi-
sions, under which motives are a key element in adjudication, have
been superimposed upon a doctrinal framework in which motives
were, and are, largely irrelevant. Absent either an agreement or a
statutory restriction to the contrary, the employment relationship
was, and generally remains, terminable at will by either party for
26. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089-91.
28. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAw OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN A NUTSHELL § 1-
1.06(1981); Note, The Proliferation of Employment Discrimination Statutory Protec-
tions: An Overview, 8 Loy. U. Cm. L. J. 934 (1977).
29. E.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local 449 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957). The Supreme Court notes that the NLRA is "the result of conflict and compromise
between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in the
free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be struck between the un-
controlled power of management and labor to further their respective interests." Carpenters,
Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958).
19831
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any or no reason. 0 A largely unrecognized and unresolved tension
between these motive-oriented statutes and at-will concepts has
created significant complications in dealing with motive and causa-
tion in labor law. Fifth, various agencies and courts incant a bewil-
dering collection of divergent and sometimes contradictory formu-
las, principles, tests and legal catchwords under different statutes
and situations. Among these formulas and phrases are "real
cause"3 1 "real motive,"82 "substantial reason," 83  "motivated in
part, '34 "but for,"35 "significant factor,"36 "the substantial, contrib-
uting factor, 37 "reasonably equal, 33  and "dominant motive."3
Such an assortment of formulas speaks for itself as a source, and
evidence, of complication and confusion in adjudications turning
upon the motives behind a particular employment action.
Given this background, it is hardly surprising that the Mt.
Healthy test has displayed strong expansive tendencies. If nothing
else, it is prevailing and expanding almost by default. The long-
30. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 442 (1958); 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §
1017 (3d ed., 1967); H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT, § 134 (1877); Annot., 62 A.L.R. 3d 271
(1975) (employer's arbitrary dismissal as breach of employment contract terminable at will).
Under such an "at-will" regime, the motives for an employer's actions are immaterial. This
doctrine, however, is eroding. See Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L. J. (1979). An employer generally can impose new terms
and conditions upon at-will employment, or discharge any at-will employee, without having
to explain the reasons to any one. Historically, even when agreement for a definite term of
employment could be established the reasons or motives behind an employer's decision were
largely immaterial. As one nineteenth-century treatise put it: "The simple question is
whether a legal cause existed for . . . discharge .... If a good ground for the servant's
discharge exists at the time of his discharge, it is sufficient, although the cause was not at
that time known to the master." H. WOOD, § 119, at 228 (emphasis in original). Under such
common law doctrines, the result was, and in the absence of statute remains, a system
whereby the terms and conditions of employment can be imposed more or less unilaterally
by the stronger party, typically the employer.
31. Behring Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 90 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3104
(1983).
32. Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1978).
33. 29 C.F.R. 1977(b) (1982) (interpretative regulation dealing with retaliation provisions
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 660(c) (1976).
34. The Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Assoc., 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976).
35. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (Title VII);
29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b) (1982) (OSHA); Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587
F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1978) (also using "partially motivated").
36. Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title VII).
37. Erie Sand Steamship Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 63 n.1 (1971).
38. NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581 F.2d 511, 514-15 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 (1st Cir. 1971).
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standing problems of dealing with motivation and causation in
general, the disarray of labor law principles and precedents in par-
ticular, and the apparent absence of satisfactory alternatives, have
all combined to create a climate favorable to some over-arching
"test" or "rule." By appearing to address head-on the difficult is-
sues associated with adjudicative inquiry into motive and causa-
tion, and by reducing those issues to a concise verbal formula, the
Mt. Healthy test offers such a rule. The mere availability of the
Mt. Healthy test is a strong incentive to its adoption in labor law
cases.
Nevertheless, an uncritical extension of Mt. Healthy's test be-
yond its original setting is not necessarily justified. More is needed
than passive acceptance of an available formula. Certainly, Mt.
Healthy itself offers little in the way of affirmative reasons for the
test which it concocted. The primary focus of Mt. Healthy is upon
the reasons for rejecting the "substantial part" approach used by
the district court. The Court's rationale for the test itself is re-
markably sparse.40 The opinion cites and describes with cryptic
brevity only some very questionable analogues drawn from crimi-
nal law precedents involving the admissibility of confessions or evi-
dence after the original "taint" of the government's constitutional
or statutory violation had been dissipated by subsequent events,
often the voluntary actions of the defendant himself.41 The Court
even concedes that "the type of causation on which the taint cases
turn may differ somewhat from that which we apply here," and
that the cited precedents do no more than "suggest. . .the proper
test to apply. '42
Thus, the very foundation for the Mt. Healthy test seems shaky,
and precedents cited for the test have little or nothing to do with
the analysis of decisionmakers' motives for a particular action. At
any rate, before the Mt. Healthy test expands further and becomes
more deeply entrenched, there seems to be some need for a more
deliberate and critical examination of the test and of the sound-
ness of extending it beyond its original boundaries.
Accordingly, this Article examines some potential flaws in the
40. 429 U.S. at 284-87.
41. Id. at 286-87.
42. Id. at 287. See Note, supra note 23, at 384-85, for a succinct critique of the preceden-
tial analogues used in Mt. Healthy.
1983l
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Mt. Healthy test and questions some of the assumptions implicit
in the test. Next, this Article considers whether there are elements
peculiar to the facts in Mt. Healthy which, arguendo, justify the
test in terms of its immediate setting, but contraindicate its exten-
sion elsewhere. This Article then focuses as a kind of case study,
upon the results which have followed in the wake of extending the
Mt. Healthy test into one important statutory area-cases involv-
ing discrimination prohibited by section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act. Finally, this Article addresses the question of
whether any "test" to determine causation and motive in the con-
text of labor law can be effectively developed before the basic
problems of the conceptual tension between common law employer
prerogatives and the more recent, motive-oriented statutory re-
strictions upon those prerogatives is recognized and confronted.
I. MOUNT HEALTHY'S FLAWS
The soundness of extending the Mt. Healthy test or rule of cau-
sation to other settings, particularly to statutory systems regulat-
ing the private employment relationship, depends in the first in-
stance upon the soundness of the Mt. Healthy test itself. The Mt.
Healthy test is supposed to protect individuals "against the inva-
sion of [their] rights without commanding undesirable conse-
quences not necessary to the assurance of those rights."43 Under
Mt. Healthy's own standard, there is some doubt regarding both
the degree of protection afforded by the test to individuals and the
lack of undesirable consequences which may flow from the applica-
tion of that test. When the Mt. Healthy test is scrutinized care-
fully, serious questions arise concerning exactly what the test
means, how it should be applied, and whether it is based on valid
assumptions about causation and human decisionmaking.
For example, one possible flaw in the test itself is an element of
either self-contradiction or confusing use of language. A plaintiff
must first establish that his protected conduct was a "substantial"
or "motivating" factor in the original decision." These words
themselves are not without ambiguity, but ordinarily they would
connote some element which influenced the outcome of the original
43. 429 U.S. at 287.
44. Id.
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decision."5 If "substantial" and "motivating" are being used in this
sense, then the Mt. Healthy test quite literally says that something
can be a "substantial" or "motivating" factor influencing the out-
come of the original decision, yet still not be "substantial" enough
to have made a difference in the outcome of the decision, that is,
the "same decision" would have been made in the absence of that
factor.
If, however, the Mt Healthy test uses the words "substantial" or
"motivating" in the sense of factors which influenced the deci-
sionmaker(s) subjectively, but did not influence the actual outcome
of the original decision, then Mt. Healthy avoids self-contradic-
tion. Construed in this fashion, "substantial" or "motivating" fac-
tor indicates a consideration which may have reinforced other fac-
tors under deliberation, but which was only of cumulative effect on
the outcome. One passage in Mt. Healthy does intimate that the
terms have this meaning. There, the opinion speaks of the deci-
sionmakers' being made "more certain of the correctness of [the]
decision "46 because the protected conduct was considered. But a
single passage is insufficient to resolve ambiguity in key terms
describing the plaintiff's burden (which cannot be totally separated
from the burden which shifts to the defendant) or to reconcile a
conceptual conflict lurking in a two-phased test which seems to
contemplate that something can be "substantial" in one phase and
so insubstantial in the second phase that it did not affect the out-
come of the decision.4 7
45. For example, "substantial" is defined as "not illusive; real; true; ... important, es-
sential, material." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2514 (2d ed.
1961). "Motivate" is defined as "to move, impel, induce, incite." Id. at 1599.
46. 429 U.S. 286 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
47. This conflict is illustrated by looking at the Mt. Healthy test in non-verbal terms.
When reduced to purely algebraic symbols the resulting sets of equations do not balance. If
A, B, and C represent all the identified "substantial" or "motivating" factors which were
considered in making the original decision, and R represents the decision, the first phase of
the Mt. Healthy test generates the equation A+B+C = R. However, the second phase of
the test says it is also possible that A+B-C = R. Hence, Mt. Healthy seems to say that
A+B+C = A+B-C, which is impossible, unless C = 0. Yet C has already been defined as
a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the original decision. One answer to this particular
conundrum is that human decisionmaking is not the mere arithmetic sum of mechanically
discrete factors. Yet, the Mt. Healthy test seems to embody just such a mechanistic and
simplistic view of human decisionmaking. Mt. Healthy assumes that the mere mechanical
subtraction of one "substantial" or "motivating" factor from the original decisionmaking
process, coupled with theorizing about what would have happened in the absence of that
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Perhaps the single most troublesome feature of the Mt. Healthy
test is its assumption that an inquiry into whether a decisionmaker
"would have reached the same decision. . . even in the absence of
the protected conduct"4 will yield reliable results when causation
is a matter of the reasons behind the decision. Nowhere in Mt.
Healthy is there any explanation of how or why this "same deci-
sion" test is probative of causation. Nevertheless, remedies for vio-
lations of important consitutional rights, and now of statutory
rights, depend upon whether this concept is a valid touchstone.
Mt. Healthy tells the adjudicator to disregard one of the factors
which entered into the original decision and then determine
whether the same decision would have been made in the absence of
that factor.49 If the same decision would have been made, then that
factor was not a sufficient "cause" of the original decision for any
legal consequences to be justified. If not examined carefully, this
proposition has a certain superficial logic. After all, it has over-
tones of the scientific method. For example, in conducting an ex-
periment to determine the effects of a particular factor upon some
observable result, the experimenter establishes a set of conditions
with only one variable. In conducting the experiment, if the results
are different when the variable is absent, the difference may well
be attributable to the variable. If the results are the same, the vari-
able does not have a causative effect. This, then, seems to be the
kind of thinking which underlies the "same decision" phase of the
Mt. Healthy test.
Thus, Mt. Healthy seems to be based upon a "scientific" model.
Unfortunately, when human decisionmaking is later challenged in
litigation, there are no controlled laboratory conditions, no system-
atic elimination of other variables, and no way to replicate the "ex-
factor, will lead to valid conclusions regarding the causative effects of that factor.
48. 429 U.S. at 287.
49. The Mt. Healthy test thus embarks adjudicators upon a hypothetical excursion into
something which did not happen. A fictional test is superimposed upon real people and real
events. Literally, Mt. Healthy tells adjudicators to ignore something which was a "substan-
tial" or "motivating" factor underlying a decisionmaker's action and then to decide whether
the "same decision" would have resulted. Legal consequences, rights, and remedies thereby
turn on ignoring something which did happen, examining a state of facts which never ex-
isted, and adjudicating in the subjunctive. Although hypothetical inquiries are not unprece-
dented in the law, it would seem difficult enough in the first instance to establish the factors
which did influence the original decision, without the added problem of attempting to figure
out what would have happened in the absence of one of those factors.
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periment" to test its validity. There is also a missing condition pre-
cedent to the validity of such an adjudicative "experiment." All
other factors have not necesarily remained the same in the interim.
The mental processes of recollection in the adversary setting of lit-
igation are simply not the mental processes which occurred in the
original decisionmaking. With the lapse of time, the factors which
initially influenced the decisionmakers may take on a different col-
oration, to say the least, when the decisionmakers are testifying as
to their reasons for the original decision.50 In a real sense, the fac-
tors motivating the decision at the time it was made are seldom, if
ever, going to be identical to subsequent justifications offered in
litigation, given human fallibility and the pressures of adversary
procedures. The conditions during litigation are simply not the
same as the conditions which existed at the time of the original
decision.
One need go no further than Mt. Healthy itself for some verifi-
cation of the above proposition. In Mt. Healthy, the original re-
sponse giving the reasons for nonrenewal, a response which was
written after consultation with the school board members 51 con-
sisted of a generalization followed by the recital of two incidents.
During the litigation more reasons-and other adverse information
concerning the teacher-were recited.52 Whether the "factors" con-
sidered originally by the school board changed or not, the reasons
given for the decision were certainly different at two different
times.53 Nevertheless, the test in Mt. Healthy pretends that
50. The Supreme Court recognized that "[a]s time passes memories fade and a person's
perception of his earlier intention may change." Consumer Prod. Safety Comm. v. GTE
Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980).
51. Appendix to petition for certiorari at 247-48, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (dis-
trict court opinion) (trial transcript).
52. 429 U.S. at 281-82. Other incidents included the teacher's refusal to accept the apol-
ogy of a fellow teacher who had slapped him; an argument in the school cafeteria over the
amount of spaghetti served to him; and his reference to certain students as "sons of bitch-
es." Id. at 283.
53. As one researcher concerned with the psychology of human motivation and decision-
making has concluded, even individuals who strive to make an objective decision in the first
instance are not necessarily so objective after the decision is made. "Once the decision is
made and the person committed to a given course of action, the psychological situation
changes decisively. There is less emphasis on objectivity and there is more partiality and
bias in the way in which the person views and evaluates the alternatives ...." B. WEINER,
THEORIES OF MOTIVATION: FROM MECHANISM TO COGNITION, 298 n.133 (emphasis
added)(quoting C. FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 155 (1964)).
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human decisionmaking is a simple enough process that one factor
in the original decision-making process can be eliminated and its
causal effects then established by an inquiry into whether the same
decision would have resulted in the absence of that factor.
A related, but more severe flaw in the Mt. Healthy conceptual-
ism is the manner in which the "same decision" phase of the test
shifts adjudicative attention away from the alleged wrong. The
question addressed by the "same decision" phase of the Mt.
Healthy test is whether a violation of constitutional rights can be
fairly said to have "caused" the harm alleged."' The answer in Mt.
Healthy, however, is found by an inquiry into whether, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the perpetrator of the constitutional
wrong "would ' 56 have reached the same decision in the absence of
the protected conduct. By eliminating the protected activity from
a key stage of the causal analysis, the adjudicative focus is shifted
by a sleight of hand to the unprotected conduct and the permissi-
ble reasons for the original decision.
When adjudicative focus is directed solely toward unprotected
conduct and permissible reasons for the original decision, the adju-
dicator embarks upon a course which leads toward upholding the
original decision. If the impermissible consideration which influ-
enced the original decision is ignored, the permissible considera-
tions, standing alone and out of proper context, will inevitably
tend to support the original decision. For a test which is supposed
to be a "rule of causation,""' Mt. Healthy's subtle shift of empha-
sis away from the alleged wrong and its causative effects, to a focus
entirely upon the reasons supporting the orginal decision, does not
stand up under scrutiny. Ignoring the very causal factor (the pro-
tected conduct) which is at issue seems unlikely to produce a relia-
ble rule of causation. Considered in isolation from the protected
conduct, the permissible reasons for the original decision take on a
life of their own, and any reasons which are not patently specious
or pretexual are likely to be convincing. This will tilt the adjudica-
tor toward finding the "same decision" would have resulted.
In addition, this shift of focus to permissible reasons and unpro-
tected conduct skews adjudication toward evaluating the mer-
54. 429 U.S. at 286.
55. Id. at 287.
56. Id. at 285.
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its-and demerits-of the individual whose rights have been vio-
lated,57 and considering whether the action taken by the original
decisionmaker was justifiable or warranted. As one leading study of
causation and the law has recognized, a hypothetical inquiry into
what "would" have happened tends to become an evaluation of
what "ought" to have happened."8 The hypothetical inquiry thus
becomes entangled with considering accepted standards of behav-
ior, rather than purely a matter of determining what truly "would"
have happened.5 9 At best, asking whether the same decision would
have been reached in the absence of protected conduct leads an
adjudicator to consider whether some hypothetical "reasonable
person" would have made the same decision based upon an evalua-
tion of the victim's character and conduct. At worst, the question
posed by the Mt. Healthy test leads an adjudicator to subjectively
place himself in the shoes of the original decisionmaker and to per-
sonally assess the "case" against the individual seeking redress.
Admittedly, some degree of attention to the merits of the indi-
vidual is unavoidable, at least subliminally, under any test. The
issue, however, is not supposed to be whether the individual got
what he deserved because of his other non-protected conduct.
Rather, the issue is whether the decisionmakers' consideration of
the protected conduct can be fairly said to have caused the harm
suffered by the individual. Mt. Healthy, again, viftually invites ad-
judicative inquiry to proceed in a direction farther away from ac-
tual causation. The emphasis of the inquiry shifts to the strength
of the justifications for the original decision. Part of the justifica-
tion for the original decision normally will be other, non-protected
conduct of the complaining party.
The "same decision" phrase of the Mt. Healthy test is analyti-
cally unsound because it concentrates adjudicative attention on
everything except the constitutional violation and its actual effects.
Moreover, this shift of emphasis is so subtle that adjudicators may
fail to realize they are being led to uphold the original decision, not
because the same decision truly "would" have been reached, but
because the adjudicators themselves would have made the same
decision. Ultimately, the Mt. Healthy test has a strong potential
57. Id. at 281-83.
58. See H. HART & A. HONORw, supra note 25, at 368.
59. Id.
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for being deferential to decisionmakers. 60
II. DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF Mt. Healthy
Even if the Mt. Healthy "rule of causation" were above re-
proach, the soundness of extending this test to the highly statutory
realm of labor law in the private sector remains to be seen. Admit-
tedly, superficial similarities exist between the facts of Mt.
Healthy and the facts commonly encountered in resolving claims
which arise under labor statutes prohibiting the discriminatory dis-
charge or discipline of employees."' Nevertheless, crucial differ-
ences exist between the situation of a public school teacher and his
putative counterpart in the private sector.
At issue in Mt. Healthy were the rights of public employees, who
under the first amendment have always been subject to a different
standard than that applied to other members of the public. Public
employees quite simply have never been as free as other citizens to
criticize their employing public officials and sow dissension. In
1968, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in Pickering v.
Board of Education6 2 the need "to arrive at a balance between in-
terests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern, and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees." ' A test or rule deferential to governmental deci-
sionmakers in Mt. Healthy is not only consistent with such lan-
guage, but also, when considered in broader perspective, is consis-
tent with whole lines of other precedents regarding the
60. One commentator has criticized the "same decision" phase of the Mt. Healthy test
as "pro-defendant" and overly deferential to governmental decisionmakers in the area of
personnel decisions involving public employees. See Note, supra note 23, at 377-78, 394.
Certainly, a test which allows the government to escape liability, even though one "substan-
tial" or "motivating" factor in a personnel decision was the employee's constitutionally pro-
tected activity, can hardly be characterized as strongly "pro-plaintiff." At any rate, the Mt.
Healthy test is more favorable to the government than the standard used by some federal
courts prior to Mt. Healthy-basically the "substantial part" test used by the district court
in Mt. Healthy. See Lane, supra note 23, at 512 n.12 and cases cited therein.
61. These superficial similarities include, of course, such elements as the existence of a
protected right, the exercise of that right by an employee, action adverse to the employee,
and a dispute about the reasons behind that action.
62. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
63. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
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constitutional rights of public employees"' and even the very power
of Congress to intrude into the public employment relationship.
In one of the few contemporary decisions to invalidate federal
legislation on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its plenary
power to regulate interstate commerce, special sensitivity was ex-
pressed about intrusions into personnel matters involving state
and local governments. National League of Cities v. Usery," de-
nied to Congress the power, under the commerce clause, 66 to im-
pose minimum wage and overtime pay standards upon state and
local governments as employers. The Usery Court gave the follow-
ing reasons to support this holding:
[These federal statutes] impermissibly interfere with the integral gov-
ernmental functions of those bodies. . . . If Congress may withdraw
from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment
decisions upon which their systems for performance of these functions
must rest, we think there would be little left of the States' 'separate and
independent existence.'. . . Congress has sought to wield its power in a
fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to function effectively in
federal system.' This exercise of congressional authority does not com-
port with the federal system of government embodied in the
Constitution.67
The renewal of teachers' contracts are archetypal instances of
"integral" state and local governmental functions. Indeed, the
Court has been more sensitive about its own intrusions into local
public schools than it has been about Congressional efforts to es-
tablish minimum wage and overtime standards for rank and file
government employees. Even at the zenith of decisions which could
be regarded as overly intrusive, the Court has continually main-
tained that as a general matter, "public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities," and that
64. For example, in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), the Supreme Court not only
gave a strained reading to a local ordinance which on its face seemed to contemplate some
form of tenure for police officers, but also emphasized that
the ultimate control of state personnel relationships is, and will remain, with the
States; they may grant or withhold tenure at their unfettered discretion. In this
case, whether we accept or reject the construction of the ordinance adopted by the
two lower courts, the power to change or clarify that ordinance will remain in the
hands of the City Council of the city of Marion.
Id. at 349-50 n.14 (emphasis added).
65. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
67. 426 U.S. at 851-52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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federal courts should not normally "intervene in the resolution of
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems.""
Judicial intervention in local school decisionmaking should be
reserved, the Court has said, for situations in which "basic consti-
tutional values" are "directly and sharply implicate[d]." Accord-
ingly, it is unsurprising that in Mt. Healthy, which involved free
speech exercise about a teacher dress code, a subject hardly going
to the "core" of the first amendment, that the Supreme Court
gravitated toward accepting a "test" or rule of causation which was
rather deferential to the governmental decisionmakers. 70 But this
complex fabric of constitutional principles which form a backdrop
for the Mt. Healthy test does not exist in the private employment
context. Rather, intrusion into private employment relationships
by Congress and state legislatures are more the norm. A substan-
tial number of legislative provisions impose various requirements
on a private employer. Thus, in public employment, judicial inter-
ference with governmental decisionmaking is made only for the
sake of preserving fundamental constitutional rights. In private
employment, by contrast, governmental interference with private
decisionmaking is based upon statutes and the courts are obliged
to interfere to uphold these statutory rules. To take a test or rule
of causation which is firmly embedded in, and perhaps justified by,
considerations of preventing unnecessary judicial ventures into
overturning the actions of governmental bodies and transpose it
wholesale to private employment relationships is to ignore an en-
tire subset of the precedents and constitutional policies which ex-
plain the Mt. Healthy test in its own special setting.
68. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. That concern about judicial intrusion into the decisions of local government bodies
played some role in formulating the Mt. Healthy test is further demonstrated by language
in the quasi-companion case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), a passage which was explicitly referenced in Mt. Healthy itself:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discrimi-
natory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged
decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of
establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissi-
ble purpose not been considered. If this were established, the complaining party
in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to
improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there
would be no justification for judicial interference with the challenged decision.
Id. at 270-71 n.21 (emphasis added).
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Besides these policy differences, there are fundamental factual
differences between the Mt. Healthy situation and private employ-
ment. The more carefully these differences are examined, the more
they begin to multiply. If nothing else, the type of employment at
issue in Mt. Healthy was a particularly sensitive position of trust
and professionalism. The special nature of public schools, and the
role of the public school teacher have few, if any, analogues to rank
and file employees in the private workplace. Public school teachers
are involved in preparing the next generation of citizens and lead-
ers.71 As Mt. Healthy itself implies, a mere ability to impart infor-
mation is necessary, but not sufficient, to guarantee fitness as a
teacher.
The wholesale, uncritical extension of the Mt. Healthy test to
private employment relationships, however, would take a poten-
tially deferential rule of causation out of its original context and
elevate it to a much more generalized status than may be war-
ranted. The special employment interests at issue7 1 in Mt. Healthy
71. Public schools have a mission to perform. That mission is entrusted primarily to
teachers who operate within the framework of a politicized system which is accountable to
the public. A "rule of causation" must give appropriate deference, in this setting, to deci-
sionmakers who must evaluate the fitness of a teacher who daily transmits not only informa-
tion, but also values and attitudes, to impressionable children and immature adolescents.
An employment decision regarding a public school teacher, therefore, involves a very special
set of qualifications and considerations. Accordingly, it might be appropriate in such a con-
text to give decisionmakers ample opportunity to demonstrate justifications for refusal to
re-employ a public school teacher, even to the extent of being less strict about the actual
causative role of the teacher's protected activity in the original decision.
72. Another important distinguishing feature in Mt. Healthy is the tenure which would
have resulted from renewal of the teacher's contract. The Supreme Court emphasized that
"[t]he long-term consequences of an award of tenure are of great moment both to the em-
ployee and the employer. They are too significant for us to hold that the Board in this case
would be precluded. . . from attempting to prove ... that he would not have been re-
hired in any event." 429 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).
Even if this represents an exaggerated view of tenure protection, one cannot deny that the
renewal of the teacher's contract in Mt. Healthy would have altered the legal nature of the
employment relationship between the teacher and the school system. The district court in
its order flatly stated that "[t]he plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement with back pay and,
upon acceptance of reinstatement at the earliest possible time, will be entitled to tenure on
the same basis as if he had been employed by the defendent Board during the interim."
Appendix to petition for certiorari, at 28-29, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The grant of
tenure which would have accompanied reinstatement in Mt. Healthy was clearly one of the
"undesirable consequences" which the resulting test was designed to obviate. 429 U.S. at
287.
The reinstatement of an individual discharged by a private employer in violation of some
statutory prohibition, however, will seldom make such a legal change in employment status.
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cannot be equated with the much more generalized economic inter-
ests of a private employer in efficiency and productivity. Superim-
posing the Mt. Healthy test upon the entire spectrum of private
employment relationships governed by various statutory provisions
disregards crucial differences between private employers and
school boards.
III. THE EXTENSION OF Mt. Healthy's RULE OF CAUSATION TO
CASES ARISING UNDER SECTION 8(A) (3) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: AN OBJECT LESSON
A. Introduction
Some of the problems attendant upon extending Mt. Healthy's
"test" into statutory systems are amply demonstrated by the situa-
tion which developed after the Mt. Healthy test was superimposed
on cases arising under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. In pertinent part, section 8(a)(3) provides: "(a) It shall
be unfair labor practice for an employer. . .(3) by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any la-
bor organization.""3
The precise meaning and application of section 8(a)(3) has long
been troublesome.7 4 The broad language of this provision covers
many possible factual situations and the number of cases which it
generates is nothing short of staggering. By the same token, the
importance of its prohibitions in protecting the statutory rights of
With the possible exception of reinstatement of a formerly probationary employee, the em-
ployee in the private employment relationship is reinstated simply to the status quo. The
"undesirable consequences" of a fundamental change in the nature of the employment rela-
tionship upon reinstatement is clearly lacking when the employee is simply reinstated to the
same employment status from which he had been discharged.
In short, if reinstatement of a private employee does not result in a fundamental change
in the legal nature of the employment relationship, a very important underpinning of the
Mt. Healthy test is eliminated. The emphasis given in Mt. Healthy to the collateral result of
tenure cannot be ignored. Where reinstatement does not result in a change analogous to
creating a tenured job, a significant factor supporting the extension of the Mt. Healthy test
immediately dissipates because the collateral "consequence" of tenure is missing.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(1976).
74. See, e.g., Christenson & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair
Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L. J. 1269, 1273-
78 (1968).
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employees under the Act, and its crucial role in fulfilling the poli-
cies of the Act, have made section 8(a)(3) a virtual battlefield for
the contending forces of organized labor and management during
the past forty years.
Collectively, the single most important subset of cases arising
under section 8(a)(3) involves charges made by employees alleging
that their union activity or adherence led to their discharge or to
some form of adverse employment action. In these cases, some evi-
dence of prohibited motive is necessary in order to establish a vio-
lation of section 8(a)(3). 75 As one court of appeals observed, how-
ever, "[riarely, if ever, does an employer admit that an employee
has been discharged for participation in union activities. Discrimi-
nation must, therefore, usually be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence, and properly so. 1 76 In these fact-intensive cases, which turn
on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, legal doctrines
must be carefully attuned to reality. On one hand, an adjudicative
approach which allows union supporters to be discharged or disci-
plined merely on the basis of any colorable showing of nonprohib-
ited reasons behind the adverse action defeats the purpose of sec-
tion 8(a)(3), and the larger policies embodied in the National
Labor Relations Act. The "protection by law of the right of em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively" 7 cannot be accom-
plished if adjudication is skewed collectively into denying a remedy
in thousands of cases where these protected rights were exercised.
The "full freedom of association" and the "friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes '7 8 is hardly furthered if employers, collectively,
may evade the limited liability of an employee's reinstatement and
back pay with relative impunity, merely by pointing to some color-
able grounds for a discharge or disciplinary action.
On the other hand, the legitimate interests of employers, and
employees themselves, in a productive, efficient workforce cannot
be denied. In section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
which denies reinstatment or back pay to an employee who was
"suspended or discharged for cause,"79 Congress itself has indi-
75. E.g., Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
76. Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 204 (10th Cir. 1967).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (Statement of Findings and Policies).
78. Id.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
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cated that evenhanded treatment of disruptive, unproductive em-
ployees should not be defeated solely because they were union ad-
herents. The need for an adjudicative approach which achieves a
proper accomodation between these competing sets of interests,
neither of which is absolute, is self-evident.
B. The Wright Line Decision
In 1980, after some prodding by the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals,80 the National Labor Relations Board reassessed in Wright
Lineal its prior "tests" of causation in section 8(a)(3) discharge and
discrimination cases. The Board's existing "in part" test had been
criticized, in some quarters, as being too favorable to the rights of
employees.8 2 This "in part" test provided that if a discharge was
motivated "in part" by the protected activities of the employee,
then the discharge violated section 8(a)(3), even if valid reasons for
the discharge also were offered.8" After a thorough canvassing of
the Board's own inconsistent formulations of this particular test,
and of the various "tests" recited by various courts of appeals,"
the Board concluded, at no risk of understatement, that "disagree-
ment and controversy are rampant among the various decision-
making bodies." 85 The Board, therefore, announced it would
henceforth "examine casuality" in cases where an employer's mo-
tive was at issue under section 8(a)(3) "through an analysis akin to
that used by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy."86 Although the
Board did not engage in any critique of the soundness of the Mt.
Healthy rule as an adequate test of causation, it did consider
whether the Mt. Healthy test was compatible with the statutory
80. E.g., NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979).
81. Wright Line, 251 N. L. R. B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 299 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). It should be noted that the Board also stated that it would
apply its new Wright Line test to charges of discriminatory treatment arising under §
8(a)(1) of the N.L.R.A., which is not limited to adverse action motivated by an employee's
union activity, but includes a wide range of protected conduct sounding in concerted activ-
ity of employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). For purposes of this Article, there is no real need to
distinguish between cases under §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). Points made with regard to § 8(a)(3)
apply with equal, and sometimes greater, force to § 8(a)(1) cases.
82. Id. at 1084.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1084-86.
85. Id. at 1086.
86. Id. at 1083 (emphasis added).
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and precedential framework of section 8(a)(3). Indeed, the Board
observed that the differences between what it actually had been
doing and the test which it was adopting in Wright Line were not
substantial: "while the Board's process has not been couched in
the language of Mt. Healthy, the two methods are essentially the
same."87 The Board explained that its decisional process tradition-
ally involved an initial "inquiry as to whether protected activities
played a role in the employer's decision. If so, the inquiry then
focuses on whether an 'legitimate business reason' asserted by the
employer is sufficiently proven to be the cause of the discipline to
negate the General Counsel's showing of prohibited motivation."88
The Board made it clear that it was doing more than superim-
posing all elements of Mt. Healthy upon section 8(a)(3) cases. As
mentioned earlier, the Board said that it was adopting "an analysis
akin"' 9 to the analysis used in Mt. Healthy. Moreover, the Board
stressed the procedural aspects of its new method of analysis:
"[T]he employer is provided with a formal framework within
which to establish its asserted legitimate justification," and the
"[a]doption of the Mt. Healthy test, with its more precise and for-
malized framework for making this analysis, [of causation] will
serve to provide the necessary clarification of our decisional
processes. '" According to the Board, therefore, the methodology
of the Mt. Healthy test was its most attractive feature.
C. The Incoherent Wake of Wright Line/Mt. Healthy in the
Courts of Appeals
Fragmentation and confusion in this area began with the judicial
review of Wright Line itself. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
had been touting the Mt. Healthy test and had appeared to have
already adopted it in section 8(a)(3) cases, shifting burden of proof
and all." Nevertheless, when Wright Line was challenged in that
court by the employer, the First Circuit began to immediately
back-pedal. The precise point of disagreement with the Board
went to the nature of the burden which the employer confronted
87. Id. at 1088.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1083 (emphasis added).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979).
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after the General Counsel established that protected conduct was a
"motivating factor" ' 2 in the employer's decision. The Board had
stated that the "burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate
that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of
the protected conduct."" Suddenly dissatisfied with its own crea-
tion, a First Circuit panel determined that, under the National La-
bor Relations Act, the "burden of proof" could never shift to the
employer: "[W]e think the only burden which may be acceptably
placed on the employer is a 'burden of production,' that is, a bur-
den of coming forward with credible evidence to rebut or meet the
general counsel's prima facie case."9 Or, "put another way, the
general counsel's initial prima facie showing creates a kind of pre-
sumption that an unfair labor practice has been committed. At this
point, the employer risks losing his case unless he rebuts the pre-
sumption with evidence of his own." '95
The First Circuit also began to find differences between the fac-
tual situation of Mt. Healthy and "most labor cases."96 The court
claimed that "[iln Mt. Healthy, the employer conceded that he
had fired the employee for speech activity which was later found to
be fully protected under the first amendment. '97 Because a viola-
tion had been established by the "employer's own admission...,
[t]he employer's claim, then, was a true affirmative defense to a
rehiring order-that is, the employer contended that notwith-
standing his violation of the Constitution, reinstatement was im-
proper as a remedy."98 Although the court characterized this dif-
ference as "critical," 99 the difference, said the court, "does not
affect the substantive utility of the 'but for' analysis there em-
ployed, but does affect the nature of the employer's burden."100
Thus, a "critical" difference between the situation in Mt. Healthy
and the situation in "most labor cases''0m was recognized in one
breath and minimized in the next. That difference, rather conve-
92. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 901-02 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
93. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
94. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 904.
95. Id. at 905.
96. Id. at 906.
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niently, went only to reducing the employer's "burden" in section
8(a)(3) cases.102
Although the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Wright Line rec-
ognized that "labels concerning burdens of 'persuasion' and 'pro-
duction' are not, as a practical matter likely to be very important
in most of these cases,"10 the first symptom of the problems of
superimposing Mt. Healthy's test upon a statutory system had al-
ready appeared. That symptom begins as not much more than a
semantic quibble, but it reflects deeper flaws in an uncritical ex-
tension of the Mt. Healthy test beyond its original setting.
First, Mt. Healthy does indeed involve a question of an affirma-
tive defense to an established violation. The constitutional viola-
tion in Mt. Healthy seems to have been established upon a show-
ing that a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the original
decision was the protected conduct.'" Yet, the Wright Line adap-
tation of that test addresses the issue of whether there was a viola-
tion, not whether a remedy should be granted.100 A test of causa-
tion which addresses the issue of whether a remedy should be
granted, despite an established constitutional violation, had then
been converted into a vehicle for deciding whether a violation had
occurred.
Second, the integral element of the employer's having a "burden
of proof" in Mt. Healthy was discarded by the First Circuit be-
cause it supposedly0 6 ran afoul of statutory allocations of burden
of proof. Thus, an initial distortion of the Mt. Healthy test (by
102. Apart from the selective manipulation of suddenly perceived differences, the First
Circuit's contention that the school board in Mt. Healthy conceded anything does not seem
supported by the briefs in that case. At least the school board's brief in the Mt. Healthy
case made no such concession. The Summary of Argument states, in bold-faced type: "1.
The Board's decision to not offer Doyle a continuing contract was not because of his call to
a local radio station." Brief of petitioner at 9, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 568 (1977). Any conces-
sions made in the course of the school board's brief were in the nature of maintaining that,
arugendo, a constitutional violation had occurred, the "presence of one constitutionally im-
permissible factor" did not "necessarily invalidate a school board's employment decision."
Id. at 14-16.
103. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 907.
104. See 429 U.S. at 285-286.
105. See Wolley, supra note 23, at 397-98.
106. At least two courts of appeals, however, have upheld the NLRB's shifting the bur-
den of proof to the employer after engaging in a careful analysis of statutory policies and
legislative history. Zurn Indus. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3110 (1983); NLRB v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1982).
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applying it to the issue of whether a violation had occurred), and a
departure from the Mt. Healthy procedural framework, began with
the first case in which the National Labor Relations Board used
the Mt. Healthy test.
At any rate, severe fragmentation among the various courts of
appeals has resulted. Some courts of appeals have accepted the Mt.
Healthy/Wright Line formula as framed by the Board, with vary-
ing degrees of analysis.10 7 Cases arising in the First, Third, and
Seventh Circuits, however, have progressively moved farther away
from the original conceptions. For example, consider the following
statement of a Third Circuit panel in Behring International v.
NLRB. 10 8
The shifting burden of persuasion undermines the 'but for' test and rein-
troduces the confusion which Wright Line purported to eliminate. To
understand why, it is only necessary to realize that in establishing a
prima facie case, the General Counsel need not prove that antiunion dis-
crimination was the "real cause" of the employee's discharge. Instead,
the Wright Line procedure only requires the General Counsel to show
that antiunion animus was "a" motivating factor in the employer's deci-
sion. If the employer then proffers a legitimate reason for its action, but
does not do so with enough weight to carry the burden of persuasion, the
Board would rule that the section 8(a)(3) charge had been proved. This
would be so despite the fact that two factors-neither outweighing the
other-had been advanced as causes and the Board never determined
which was the real one. As such, the procedural aspect of the rule is
plainly at odds with the "but for" rule.1 "9
The "but for" test referenced in Behring is the concept that the
"same action would have taken place even in the absence of the
protected conduct."" This "same action" language is, of course,
synonymous with the "same decision" phrase used in Mt. Healthy.
According to Behring, then, the Supreme Court's own imposition
of a burden of proof upon the school board in Mt. Healthy is
"plainly at odds" with the rest of Mt. Healthy's rule of causation.
But Behring does not explore the implications of this perceived
flaw in the original Mt. Healthy test. Instead, Behring merely says,
"Mt. Healthy is inapposite in its shifting burden phase, however,
107. For a summary of court of appeals cases, see Zurn Indus. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d at 687
n.9.
108. 675 F.2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3104 (1983).
109. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 87.
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because the Board is bound by statutory limitations which fore-
close the issue."""1 Without further exploration of the merits of the
Wright Line/Mt. Healthy test, the opinion concludes that because
"none of these statutory or regulatory provisions were applicable in
Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court was free to allocate the burden of
proof.""'
Not content with telling the National Labor Relations Board
that it had adopted an internally flawed test, which was inconsis-
tent with statutory provisions, Behring then found "more appro-
priate precedent" in recent Supreme Court decisions arising under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." '1 The leading Supreme Court
opinion cited in this regard was Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine." This superimposing of Burdine upon the is-
sues in section 8(a)(3) cases turning on the motives of an employer
is even more troublesome than the original extension of Mt.
Healthy to section 8(a)(3) cases.
The situation since the Board's adoption of the Mt. Healthy ap-
proach has progressively deteriorated. The First Circuit has gone
from warning the Board that it had better adopt the Mt. Healthy
test,11 to quibbling about the kind of burden which shifts to the
employer,"16 to a decision which rejects the concept that the em-
ployer has any burden of "overcoming the General Counsel's
prima facie case by establishing that [the employee] would have
been discharged even absent his union activities."' 1 7 The employer,
under the First Circuit's test, apparently need only "neutralize"
the implications arising from a prima facie case.1 8 Moreover, the
Third and Seventh" 9 Circuit Courts of Appeals explicitly have im-
posed a Burdine-type test, drawn from Supreme Court precedents,
111. Id. at 88.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
115. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining, 598 F.2d 666, 671-72 (1st Cir. 1979).
116. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 904-07.
117. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130, 131 (1st Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (emphasis in original) (apparently quoting the NLRB's opinion), rev'd, 103 S. Ct.
2469 (1983).
118. Id.
119. Behring, 675 F.2d 83; NLRB v. Webb Ford, 689 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1982); con-
tra NLRB v. Town & Country LP Gas Serv., 687 F.2d 187, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1982); Peavey
Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461 (7th Cir. 1981).
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that has little to do with causation and the exercise of protected
rights. Behring has gone so far as to revert to a requirement that
the General Counsel prove that antiunion animus was the "real
cause" of the discharge or discrimination, 20 whatever "real cause"
may mean. Moreover, at least one panel of the Seventh Circuit has
adopted the Behring approach and stated that the employer "need
only neutralize the prima facie case by asserting a legitimate rea-
son for the discharges; the burden of demonstrating that reason
pretextual remains with the Board.''1
Rather clearly, then, the Mt. Healthy test has not weathered
well its transfer from constitutional territory to cases arising under
statutory provisions designed to protect important employee
rights. The situation is not that far removed from the original frag-
mentation and confusion of "tests" which the National Labor Re-
lations Board summarized so well in its original Wright Line
decision.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court in all likelihood will address
some of the confusion which has resulted. Certiorari has been
granted in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,'2- a First
Circuit case. The question presented is whether the Board properly
concluded that a violation of section 8(a)(3) had been established
when employer hostility to an employee's protected union activity
was shown to be a motivating factor in the decision to discharge,
and the employer did not establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would have discharged the employee for legitimate
reasons, absent his union activities. 24 Thus, the issue of the bur-
den of proof in section 8(a)(3) cases should be addressed in the
near future.
Unfortunately, resolution of this issue is no assurance that frag-
mentation among the courts of appeals will be cured. As discussed
shortly,125 there may be a deeper source of fragmentation and con-
fusion at work in cases involving inquiries into whether statutorily
prohibited motives played a part in an employer's decision. Dis-
120. 675 F.2d at 90.
121. NLRB v. Webb Ford, 689 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1982).
122. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084-86.
123. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd 103
S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
124. Id.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 153-77.
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pute over burdens of proof may be more a symptom than a disease.
Until the deeper problem is identified and resolved, fragmentation
and confusion could well continue, although disguised as divergent
and disparate applications of any "test" which the Supreme Court
may uphold or impose regarding the burden of proof.
Before addressing that point, however, a more immediate prob-
lem must be noted. Although Transportation Management itself
did not apply a Burdine approach, the Burdine test still may creep
into the disposition of this case. For one thing, the Burdine test
has demonstrated some expansive tendencies of its own."' For an-
other, it is possible that certiorari will be granted in a section
8(a)(3) case from the Seventh or Third Circuits. 12 7 If this happens,
then the Burdine test would be before the Supreme Court more
directly as an alternative to Wright Line/Mt. Healthy. In either
event, a digression of sorts seems warranted at this juncture in or-
der to raise briefly a few points regarding the appropriateness of
extending Burdine's approach to section 8(a)(3) cases.
D. The Burdine Test and Section 8(a)(3) Cases
Those courts of appeals which have resorted to Burdine2 8 as a
model for an analysis of the issues in a section 8(a)(3) case are
using an approach which is even farther afield than Mt. Healthy.
In Mt. Healthy, at least, there were certain superficial similarities
between the fact-pattern of that case and cases arising under sec-
tion 8(a)(3).120 In Burdine, and its related predecessors, however,
the issue is not the causative role of the exercise of protected
rights. Burdine and its predecessors deal with so-called "disparate
treatment" cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 30 In Bur-
dine, there is no need to accomodate an employer's interest in
workplace production and efficiency to the interests reflected in
protecting the exercise of statutory rights such as those which in-
volve self-help organizational efforts on behalf of unionization. 81
Under Title VII, the closer analogues to section 8(a)(3) would be
126. See supra text accompanying notes 113-21.
127. NLRB v. Blackstone Co., 685 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110
(1983).
128. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
129. See supra note 61.
130. 450 U.S. at 253.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 29 and 72.
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found in those provisions which prohibit any discrimination
against an employee "because he has opposed any practice"'13 2
which is unlawful under Title VII and, perhaps the provision
prohibiting retaliation against a person who "has made a charge,
testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investiga-
tion, proceeding, or hearing" under Title VII.'s The Supreme
Court apparently has not addressed directly the issue of causation
in a "mixed motive" case arising under these provisions.'3 4 Nor can
it be assumed casually that the "test" in "disparate treatment"
precedents arising under section 703 of Title VII 3" should be
blindly extended to cases involving section 704, although some fed-
eral courts seem to have done so.'s' By its own terms, the Burdine
language, with regard to the plaintiff's initial burden, deals with
quite another matter:
The plaintiff must show: '(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualification, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.'
This standard is not inflexible, as '[t]he facts necessarily will vary in
Title VII cases, and the specifications above of the prima facie proof re-
quired from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect in
differing factual situations.'18 7
As the Supreme Court admonishes in Burdine and its predeces-
sors, the standard for a prime facie case is not inflexible. The en-
tire Burdine test, however, is so oriented toward a case in which
there is some form of choice between two or more applicants for a
position, or a difference in the treatment of two or more persons,
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-3 (1976).
133. Id.
134. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 436 (1976). This
text also indicates that courts have varied in articulating the standard of proof for causation
in these retaliation cases. Id. at 125 (Supp. 1979).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1976).
136. E.g., Smalley v. Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981); Whatley v. Metropoli-
tan Atlanta Rapid Transit, 632 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir. 1981); Brown v. ASD Computing
Center, 519 F. Supp. 1096, 1116 (D. Ohio 1981); Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. 425 F.
Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). See also B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 134.
137. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6 (quoting McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 & n.13 (1973)) (emphasis added).
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that its transfer to the much more nebulous inquiry into the rea-
sons for discharge or discipline would wrench the Burdine test to-
tally out of its precedential sockets. In a disparate treatment case,
the facts involve a direct comparison between the plaintiff(s) and
others who have been more favorably treated. In most section
8(a)(3) cases, the matter is not so simple. There may be a whole
constellation of reasons for the employer's decision to discharge or
discipline, and comparisons, if any, are typically with past discipli-
nary cases.
Looking at each phase of the Burdine test, in turn, emphasizes
rather clearly its questionable relevance to a typical section 8(a)(3)
case. The prima facie showing required by Burdine, as indicated
above, focuses only upon the reasons for differences in treatment
and not the reasons for firing or disciplining an employee. Even
those Supreme Court predecessors of Burdine which dealt with
cases originally arising out of discharge or discipline focus upon
the allegedly disparate treatment of the plaintiff(s), and not upon
the reasons or causes behind the original discipline or discharge.'"
Moreover, a prima facie case of "disparate treatment" was charac-
terized by the Supreme Court in Burdine as "not onerous," 189 be-
speaking something less demanding than establishing that a "sub-
stantial" or "motivating" factor in the original decision has been
prohibited racial or other prejudice. The Burdine prima facie case
is so oriented toward a less "onerous" showing by the plaintiff that
superimposing it upon a section 8(a)(3) case would be quite mis-
guided. Either the Burdine prima facie requirement would have to
be manipulated in such a manner as to hamper its vitality, or the
General Counsel's initial burden would become one of only show-
ing support of a union, qualification for the job, adverse action,
and other elements more or less analogous to the rather mild Bur-
dine prima facie showing. Indeed, those federal courts which have
extended Burdine-type analysis to section 704 retaliation cases
seem to have established a rather mild set of requirements for a
prima facie showing. 140
Looking at the next phase of the Burdine test, the same
138. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
139. 450 U.S. at 253.
140. See supra cases cited at note 136.
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problems exist. In the second phase of Burdine, the burden shifts
to the employer to rebut a mild presumption established by a weak
prima facie case. The employer does this by producing "evidence
that plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."141 Again, by its very lan-
guage, the Burdine formula is cast in terms of an employment de-
cision based upon a choice among people and disparate treatment
which can be addressed in the context of examining the qualifica-
tions of, or differences between, particular individuals. Accord-
ingly, the second phase of Burdine would need to be modified if it
were superimposed on section 8(a)(3).
The third phase of the Burdine model likewise contemplates a
kind of inquiry which is at odds with principles governing the sort
of section 8(a)(3) cases dealt with by Wright Line. If the defendant
employer carries its burden of production in Burdine, the "factual
inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity."' 142 The plaintiff now
has the "opportunity to demonstrate pretext,"1 43 or to demon-
strate "that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision. 1' 44 Quite explicitly, Burdine is concerned
with pretexts.
"Pretext" is an inappropriate term to use in connection with an
inquiry into allegedly "mixed" motives behind an employment de-
cision. A pretext is an ostensible reason offered as a cover for the
real reason an action was taken.146 According to the NLRB, at
least, an inquiry into whether an asserted reason is a pretext is
concerned only with determining that there is no legitimate reason
for such action,1 46 or that reasons offered were "wholly without
merit. 1 47 There is no issue of the "existence of both a 'good' and a
'bad' reason for the employer's action [which] requires further in-
quiry into the role played by each motive. 1 4 Superimposing Bur-
dine upon section 8(a)(3) cases in this respect is tantamount to
either requiring a new definition of "pretext," or limiting section
141. 450 U.S. at 254 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 255.
143. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1069 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
146. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084.
147. Id. at 1084 n.5.
148. Id. at 1084.
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8(a)(3) to cases in which the reasons proffered by an employer
were a "sham.""' There is, in fact, some indication that the Su-
preme Court has used the word "pretext" in disparate treatment
cases in a rather loose sense. As McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.150 put it, "'pretext' in this context does not
mean . . . that the Title VII plaintiff must show that he would
have. . . been rejected or discharged solely on the basis of his race
.; no more is required to be shown than that race was a 'but for'
cause."1 51 Nevertheless, the semantic pull of the word "pretext" is
strong. The very use of the work "pretext" will tilt analysis in the
direction of requiring proof of a total lack of legitimate reasons for
the employer's decision. If section 8(a)(3) becomes effective only in
cases of "pretext," the need for inquiry into "mixed" motives dis-
appears. "Mixed" motives then would become permissible under
section 8(a)(3). The declared policy of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is to protect, by law, the "full freedom of association,
self-organization, and the designation of representatives of their
own choosing" by employees. " 2 That "full freedom" is hardly pro-
tected by allowing employers to escape liability if the General
Counsel fails to show anything less than totally pretextual reasons
for discharge or discriminatory treatment of union adherents.
In short, Burdine deals with a procedural framework for an en-
tirely different type of case, Title VII "disparate treatment" litiga-
tion. Burdine itself does not address a "rule of causation" to be
applied in cases where statutorily prohibited conduct was a "sub-
stantial" or "motivating" factor in the employer's original decision
to discharge or discipline an employee. Thus, whether one consid-
ers either the overall perspective of the Burdine analysis or ele-
ments of its various phases, the Burdine analysis is inapposite to
section 8(a)(3) discharge or discipline cases. Hence, either Burdine
would need to be modified drastically, or section 8(a)(3) policies
and interests would have to be sacrificed to comport with Bur-
dine's formalism.
149. Id.
150. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
151. Id. at 282 n.10.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (emphasis added).
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IV. A ROOT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM
As indicated earlier in this Article,153 statutory regulation of pri-
vate employment has become pervasive. Starting in 1935, with the
National Labor Relations Act, and accelerating during the 1960's
and 1970's'" successive layers of statutory restrictions have cur-
tailed employer prerogatives. Many of these restrictions demand
inquiry into the reasons behind an employer's decision. 155 These
motive-oriented restrictions, however, have been superimposed
upon, and coexist with, a doctrinal framework in which the em-
ployer's reasons for decisions relative to employees are largely
immaterial.15"
An adjudicatory system in which the need for inquiry into mo-
tive and causation coexists sub silentio with doctrines under which
motive and causation are largely irrelevant is a system suffering
from severe internal tension. A predictable result of such hidden
tension is conflict and conceptual cleavage among adjudicators. Ac-
cordingly, the divergent "tests" of causation and motive1 57 in labor
cases may reflect more than simple disagreement regarding the in-
terpretation of particular statutory provisions. They may reflect di-
vergent and perhaps unexamined assumptions regarding the
proper relationship between the prior legal doctrines and the new
statutory provisions.
In other words, the new statutory provisions, under which mo-
tive and causation are crucial elements in much labor litigation,
simply have been neither assimilated into the old framework nor
reconciled adequately with that framework. To paraphrase a noted
economist, the difficulty in adapting to changing conditions is not
so much one of getting people to accept new ideas as it is of getting
people to give up or modify old ideas." 8 With each successive stat-
utory layer, adjudicators have confronted, to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, the need to analyze an employer's decisions in terms of the
153. See supra text accompanying note 28.
154. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
155. Virtually any statutory prohibition sounding in alleged discriminatory treatment
"because of" some protected activity will entail inquiry into the reasons for the employer's
decision. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
156. See supra text accompanying note 30.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
158. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (MacMillan
1935).
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causes and motives behind those decisions.
Although courts and agencies that have entertained the new
ideas of restrictions upon employer prerogatives, the degree and
nature of that acceptance has varied. Some adjudicators seem to be
governed by the concept that employers' prerogatives remain the
doctrinal rule to which the new statutory restrictions are mere ex-
ceptions. 59 Others have reflected conceptual approaches that ac-
comodate traditional employer prerogatives in varying degrees.
Thus conceived, the divergent formulations noted earlier in this
Article may represent points along a conceptual spectrum. For ex-
ample, as one progresses from "real cause," 160 to "dominant mo-
tive,"1 61 to "in part,''1 62 one may be moving from formulas reflect-
ing maximum preservation of employer prerogatives under
common law concepts to formulas reflecting greater emphasis on
the statutory protections.
Unless and until this underlying conceptual tension is recog-
nized, brought to the surface, and directly addressed, neither the
Mt. Healthy test, nor any other test, will prevent fragmentation
and confusion. If the conceptual tension is not resolved, the old
tendency will remain for adjudicators to divide along lines gov-
erned, as in the past, by unspoken and unexamined assumptions.
Any new test superimposed on the statutory regimes will continue
to be applied, more likely than not, in a manner which is compati-
ble with the underlying assumptions of the adjudicator. The net
result will be only to sublimate further, and mask, a major deter-
minative factor in the outcome of cases which, collectively, are cru-
cial to the sound functioning of the statutory systems. A funda-
mental conflict and conceptual cleavage which contributed, in the
first instance, to a multitude of "tests" will continue to percolate
beneath the surface.
Therefore, a pre-occupation with developing, and defending, spe-
cific "tests" for motive and causation in cases arising under various
labor statutes may be counterproductive and premature. An appro-
priate "test" cannot be articulated until there is a determination
regarding the overall interpretative approach which should govern
159. See infra text accompanying notes 163-69.
160. Behring, 675 F.2d at 90.
161. NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 (lot Cir. 1971).
162. The Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Assoc., 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976).
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adjudication. Any "tests" developed for these cases should emerge
from consideration of the policies reflected in the statutes and the
approach indicated by these policies. Once an overall interpreta-
tive approach and philosophy is crystallized, then the time for for-
mulating a verbal "test" which reflects that approach and philoso-
phy has arrived.
The first step in reconciling the tension between the common-
law framework of employer prerogatives and the new, motive-ori-
ented statutory restrictions is to recognize that these statutory
provisions represent a change in the status quo. The statutory pro-
tections afforded employees are not mere grudging and narrow ex-
ceptions to a general rule which still prevails after their enactment.
This conception of the statutory restrictions as reflecting only a
narrow exception is exemplified most starkly by a tendency in
some quarters to cling steadfastly to shibboleths such as
"[m]anagement can discharge for good cause, or bad cause, or no
cause at all. It has, as the master of its own business affairs, com-
plete freedom with but one specific, definite qualification: it may
not discharge when the real motivating purpose is to do that which
section 8(a)(3) forbids."16 s
This is language which embodies an underlying concept that
statutory intrusions upon employer prerogatives are narrow excep-
tions to the prior regime of governmental non-interference with
matters of private employment. This is not the language of ac-
comodation between competing interests. Rather, it is the language
of subordinating the statutory polices to private interests. This
kind of pronouncement was an inaccurate overstatement when it
was written in 1956,164 and it has become even less accurate with
the passage of time.
Restrictions upon an employer's "complete freedom" have multi-
plied since 1956. An employer no longer has "complete freedom" to
163. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956) (emphasis added).
164. For example, other provisions limiting an employer's right to discharge employees
were contained in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (a)(4), and in
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). Moreover, management's "complete
freedom" is circumscribed if a collective bargaining representative is recognized or certified
under the National Labor Relations Act; there then arises a duty to bargain in good faith
with the representative over wages and terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. §
158 (a)(5) § 159. Terms and conditions of employment include, of course, grounds and pro-
cedures for termination. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 404 (1971). Thus, manage-
ment's "complete freedom" to discharge was circumscribed considerably even in 1956.
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consider age, sex, race, ethnic origin, or religion in employment de-
cisions.""5 An employer does not have "complete freedom" to retal-
iate against an employee who files a complaint or testifies in pro-
ceeding against the employer.' 6 An employer's plenary workplace
authority to act for any reasons or no reason at all has been cir-
cumscribed in numerous ways. 16 7 Yet, the basic "complete free-
dom" shibboleth' 68 keeps being repeated."6 9 The dogged persis-
tence of this incantation is explainable only on the basis of its
reflecting an unspoken view that all of these restrictions on em-
ployers' prerogatives amount to no more than limited and narrow
incursions upon an otherwise plenary power.
At some point, however, the sheer number of such statutory re-
strictions upon employer prerogatives becomes significant. When
the cumulative significance of these generations of statutory re-
strictions is considered, then the general direction of the interpre-
tive approach or philosophy becomes more clear. The number and
variety of restrictions on traditional employer prerogatives indicate
the need for the prerogatives to be accomodated to the restrictions,
rather than vice-versa.
Therefore, the second step in reconciling the tensions between
common law employer prerogatives and their statutory restrictions
is to recognize that these restrictions individually, and cumula-
tively, reflect a clear legislative purpose to rectify certain "mis-
chiefs' 70 attendant upon an employers' untrammeled exercise of
economic power, which the common law at-will concepts had sup-
ported. These statutes, then, are remedial in nature. The basic in-
terpretive touchstone for remedial legislation is to give such legis-
lation a construction which will fulfill the statutory purposes'7 and
tend more toward remedy of the harm than preserving the sources
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1976).
166. See supra notes 21 and 22.
167. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
169. E.g., Berry Schools v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1981); Midwest Stock
Exch. Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255, 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
170. See Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
171. See generally J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 60.01,
60.02 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973) (remedial statutes entitled to a liberal construction). It is well
established that the National Labor Relations Act is remedial legislation which is to be
liberally construed. Id. at § 71.07.
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of that harm.'" At least, the interpretive approach must move
away from the situation which called that legislation into being,
rather than trying to revert toward the status quo. Any resulting
"test" or "rule" should be one which resolves doubts in favor of
protecting those rights which the statutes were supposed to pro-
tect, ' " rather than protecting those prerogatives which the statute
restricted.
Formulating the precise test of "rule of causation" then becomes
a matter of developing or discovering language consistent with this
approach. Whether, for example, the Mt. Healthy test is consistent
with a remedial approach to interpreting protective labor statutes
remains to be seen. In its original form, the Mt. Healthy test as-
sumes that protected activity can be a "substantial" or "motivat-
ing" factor in decisionmaking, yet still fall short of requiring a
remedy if the "same decision" would have been reached in the ab-
sence of that protected activity. As such, Mt. Healthy is basically
an "in spite of" test, rather than a "but for" test, as it has some-
times been characterized. 174 In spite of a constitutional violation,
which is established when protected activity is shown to be a "sub-
stantial" or "motivating" factor in the original decision, 175 a rem-
edy is nevertheless denied. To convert this into a "test" or "rule"
so deferential to private employers that no violation is found, even
though statutorily protected activity is demonstrably a "motivat-
ing" factor in the original decision, seems analytically closer to pre-
serving prerogatives than it is to protecting statutory rights.
A test which comes closer to fulfilling the remedial purpose of
such legislation requires a determination of whether the statutorily
protected conduct influenced the outcome of the original decision.
If a particular factor influences the outcome of a decision, it can be
fairly said to have been a cause of the decision. The test itself
might take any number of particular verbal forms. The concept,
however, should be whether the original outcome was in fact influ-
enced by prohibited reasons. In this manner, the legitimate busi-
ness interests of employers seems adequately protected. After all,
employers are not supposed to be considering the employees' stat-
172. Id. at § 60.01.
173. Id.
174. E.g., Behring, 675 F.2d at 87.
175. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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utorily protected activities in the first place. 76 A test predicated
upon the actual effect of an employer's considering those protected
activities and whether those protected activities influenced the
outcome of the initial decision gives some leeway to accomodate
those situations in which the protected activity "was inevitably on
the minds of those responsible for the decision.' 177 Likewise, this
approach accomodates those situations in which consideration of
the protected activity was merely cumulative or reinforced the de-
cision which was reached. But, whenever the protected activity in-
fluenced the outcome of the employer's original decision, a finding
of violation seems to be mandated. Otherwise, important statutory
protections are eroded.
POST-SCRIPT
While this Article was being prepared for publication, the Su-
preme Court rendered a unanimous opinion in NLRB v. Transpor-
tation Management1 78 upholding the Board's Wright Line test. Al-
though it is premature to assess the implications of
Transportation Management, some preliminary observations are
clearly warranted.
To begin, the Court unequivocally sustained the Board's author-
ity to impose upon an employer the burden of establishing any
claim that a discharge, although motivated in part by statutorily
prohibited considerations, was still not an unfair labor practice be-
cause the discharge would have occured in any event, upon the ba-
sis of legitimate reasons. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
canvassed the long history of Board precedents dealing with the
mixed motive issue and agreed that the Board's recent Wright
Line test was merely "an attempt to restate its [earlier] analysis in
a way more acceptable to the Courts of Appeals. 179 According to
the Court, the Board since 1939 had engaged essentially in a two-
stage analysis. First, a violation could be established by the Gen-
eral Counsel's proof that a discharge or other adverse action was
176. See Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Em-
ployee Choice, 32 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 735 (1965).
177. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
178. 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
179. Id. at 2473 (emphasis added).
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"in any way motivated by a desire to frustrate union activity."' 80
This principle was approved by the Court in Transportation Man-
agement as "plainly rational and acceptable. 18 ' Next, however,
the Board had also ruled that employers could "escape the conse-
quences of a violation by proving that without regard to the imper-
missible motivation, the employer would have taken the same ac-
tion for wholly permissible reasons.' 8 2
In Transportation Management, the Court also emphasized, or
re-emphasized, the latitude to be accorded the Board in formulat-
ing working legal principles to govern adjudications under the stat-
utes which it enforces. The Board's Wright Line approach, "'while
it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible under it
.' and in these circumstances its position is entitled to
deference."18'
But Transportation Management went beyond mere deference
to the Board's interpretation. There were, noted the Court, reasons
affirmatively supporting the Board's long-standing position and its
restatement in Wright Line:
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is de-
clared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he
knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by inno-
cent activity but by his own wrongdoing. 8
4
Or, as this Article indicates, employers are not supposed to con-
sider an employee's statutorily protected activities in the first




183. Id. at 2475 (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975); NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)). It should also be noted that the Court
pointedly rejected the use of the Burdine test suggested by some courts of appeal. See supra
text at notes 128-52. The Burdine alternative was dismissed in a footnote as "inapposite"
because it dealt with pretexts, and not "mixed motive" situations. Id. at 2473 n.5.
184. Id. at 2475 (emphasis added).
185. See supra text at note 176.
Transportation Management also reflects an interesting reading of Board precedents with
respect to the necessary elements of an unfair labor practice:
As we understand the Board's decisions, they have consistently held that the un-
fair labor practice consists of a discharge of other adverse action that is based in
whole or in part on anti-union animus .... But the Board's construction of the
statute permits an employer to avoid being adjudicated a violator by showing
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With respect to the Court's treatment of Mt. Healthy, Trans-
portation Management was rather cursory:
We found it prudent, albeit in a case implicating the Constitution, to set
up an allocation of the burden of proof on which the Board heavily re-
lied on [sic] and borrowed from in its Wright Line decision. There, we
held that the plaintiff had to show that the employer's disapproval of his
First Amendment protected expression played a role in the employer's
decision to discharge him. If that burden of persuasion were carried, the
burden would be on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that he would have reached the same decision, even if, hypo-
thetically, he had not been motivated by a desire to punish plaintiff for
exercising his First Amendment rights. The analogy to Mount Healthy
drawn by the Board was a fair one. 86
The offhand characterizations and noncommittal paraphrase of
Mt. Healthy's test hardly warrants any sweeping generalizations.
Nevertheless, it is at least interesting that the Court used the word
"prudent,' '5 7 mentioned the constitutional context of the Mt.
Healthy test,"s' inserted the adverb "hypothetically,"' 89 and re-
ferred to Mt. Healthy as a "fair" "analogy."' 90 In any event,
what his actions would have been regardless of the forbidden motivation. It ex-
tends to the employer what the Board considers to be an affirmative defense, but
does not change or add to the elements of an unfair labor practice .... Id. at
2474.
This Article points out that the inconsistent legal formulas and tests dealing with motive
as a causal element in labor law are traceable, at least in part, to the unreconciled tension
between a substratum of common-law "at will" doctrines, under which an employer's mo-
tives are immaterial, and the motive-intensive inquiries necessitated by more recent statu-
tory prohibitions upon traditional employer prerogatives. One result of this tension, argua-
bly, was language amounting to unsound shibboleths in some cases which overstated, to the
detriment of statutory protections, an employer's "complete freedom" to act for any reason
or no reason at all, so long as the "real motivating purpose" was not statutorily prohibited.
Although Transportation Management did not address these tensions or shibboleths, the
overall tenor of the opinion, and the apparent consensus that an unfair labor practice is
established upon the showing of actions motivated only in part by statutorily forbidden
motives, would seem to require rejection of an overly narrow view of the employee's statu-
tory protections. In the face of Transportation Management, continued insistence in some
judicial quarters upon a showing of "real motivating purpose," or even "dominant motive"
does not seem tenable.
186. 103 S. Ct. at 2475 (emphasis added).
187. See supra text at notes 68-70.
188. See supra text at notes 188, 62-70.
189. See supra text at note 49.
190. See supra text at notes 61-72. As this Article indicates, the author does not necessa-
rily concede that the "analogy" between private and public employment is as strong as it
might appear on the surface. Certainly, Transportation Management speaks merely in
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Transportation Management does not necessarily endorse an au-
tomatic extension of the Mt. Healthy test to other settings or sup-
port a view that Mt. Healthy offers a panacea for problems of mo-
tivation and causation. Moreover, the Court's characterization of
the defendant's burden under Mt. Healthy is not precisely accu-
rate. Mt. Healthy speaks in terms of whether the same decision
would have been made "even in the absence of the protected con-
duct."191 As paraphrased in Transportation Management, it is the
absence of a prohibited motivation which is hypothesized, not the
absence of the protected conduct. This may well be a distinction
without a difference since a slight inconsistency between the word-
ing of a paraphrase and an earlier holding is neither unprecedented
nor momentous. Yet, the two concepts are not totally congruent or
interchangeable. As this Article indicates, a test which seemingly
directs adjudicators to disregard the very existence of the pro-
tected conduct at issue is subject to a number of criticisms.'" A
test which concentrates on hypothesizing about what a decision
might have been if prohibited motivations had not existed would
still be objectionable, but might require a somewhat different anal-
ysis. At any rate, it may not be totally insignificant that the precise
elements of the Mt. Healthy test, and precisely what it is that a
defendant must establish, have not yet crystallized into a stan-
dardized litany.
Despite the Supreme Court's resolution of the immediate issue
in Transportation Management, the results in this instance of ex-
tending the Mt. Healthy test, even by way of analogy, into other
areas remain instructive. Adoption of a test "akin" to Mt. Healthy
simply aggravated an existing situation and generated a relatively
prompt Supreme Court action. Not all adoptions or extensions of
Mt. Healthy's test will be so visible, so controversial, or so expedi-
tiously addressed by the Court. Indeed, there is some risk that
Transportation Management will be read superficially as placing
the Court's imprimatur upon any and all extensions of Mt.
Healthy's test to other domains. The immediate result may eclipse
the somewhat guarded descriptions in Transportation Manage-
ment of what the Board had done in Wright Line. "[T]he Board
terms of the analogy being "fair," and does not overstate the matter.
191. 429 U.S. at 287.
192. See supra text at notes 48-60.
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heavily relied on and borrowed from" Mt. Healthy.193 Wright Line
was "an attempt to restate [the Board's earlier] analysis in a way
more acceptable to the Courts of Appeals."' " The failure of the
Board's "attempt" in this respect and the need for the Supreme
Court's early intervention should stand more as a caveat than an
endorsement on a too-easy, too-ready extension of Mt. Healthy's
test.
193. 103 S. Ct. at 2475.
194. Id. at 2473 (emphasis added).
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